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COMMENT
WATER LAW - ACT OF GOD DEFENSE - FLOOD DAMAGE
FfOm REsERVOiR OvEnow - Barr v. Game, Fish &
Parks Comm'n, 497 P.2d 340 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972).
T HE Colorado Game, Fish and Parks Commission had almost
completed construction of a dam and spillway on Clay
Creek when, in June of 1965, heavy rains fell over the Clay
Creek drainage basin resulting in a flood of unprecedented
magnitude.' The Commission, in their design and construction
of the dam and reservoir, left a ridge on one side of the reser-
voir basin at a lower elevation than the dam crest.2 A combina-
tion of this dam height and a limited spillway capacity3 caused
the flood waters to overflow the low point in the ridge. The
result was considerable damage to the property of numerous
plaintiffs situated below the ridge. In a suit by these plaintiffs,
judgment was entered against the Commission.
On appeal, the defendant Commission argued that the flood
was of such magnitude that it was an act of God, and therefore
no liability could be attached to the incident. The Colorado
Court of Appeals refused to accept this argument on the
grounds that the evidence was sufficient to show that de-
fendant's engineers could have foreseen a flood of this magni-
tude by use of the maximum probable flood technique. As fore-
seeability precludes the act of God defense, the defendant Com-
mission was held liable under Colorado's absolute liability
statute4 for damages resulting from overflow from a reservoir.5
Initially, the opinion of the court appears to adhere to the
accepted precedent that proven foreseeability of a given occur-
rence will preclude the act of God defense.6 However, the court
I The peak flow at the reservoir site was 158,000 cubic feet of water per
second of time (c.f.s.). The previous high flow of water in Clay Creek
was 27,500 c.f.s. Barr v. Game, Fish and Parks Comm'n, 497 P.2d 340,
342 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972).
2 The dam crest elevation was 3,670 feet above sea level. The low point
in the ridge was at 3,666 feet above sea level. Id.
3 The plans indicated that the spillway was designed to discharge a flow
of 33,000 c.f.s. The spillway as built, however, would discharge only
4,500 c.f.s. Id.
4 "The owners of the reservoirs shall be liable for all damages arising
from leakage or overflow of the waters therefrom or floods caused by
breaking of the embankments of such reservoirs." COLo. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 148-5-4 (1963).
5 Barr v. Game, Fish and Parks Comm'n, 497 P.2d 340 (Colo. Ct. App.
1972).
6 See Annot., 169 A.L.R. 517, 534 (1947). See generally Comment, 18
WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 336 (1961).
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in Barr has created a standard of foreseeability based on what
the reasonable engineer should have foreseen tested by the
engineering technique of maximum probable flood prediction.
This comment will compare the novelty of this test to earlier
Colorado case law and examine the potentially serious ambigui-
ties created by this change in the law.
I. COLORADO PRECEDENT
The Colorado precedent on the act of God defense and its
application under the statute of liability for reservoir overflow
is fragmented and sparse. Prior to Barr, the Colorado courts
were never forced to consider the multi-faceted aspects of the
problem in any one case. It is possible, however, through a
conjunctive analysis of this precedent to discover the basis for
the court's holding in Barr.
In an early construction of the overflow statute, the Colo-
rado Supreme Court, in Garnet Ditch & Reservoir Co. v. Samp-
son,7 held that the statute placed an absolute liability upon the
reservoir owner for damage caused by' seepage, overflow, or
flood resulting from dam failure, and therefore reasonable care
and foresight by the owner does not excuse liability. Although
the act of God defense was not in issue since there was no
storm or flood upon which to base it, the court indirectly
addressed the problem by stating that "unless an exception
appears in the statute we must presume that none was
intended . . . .,,1
The court directly faced the availability of the act of God
defense in an action brought under the overflow statute in
Ryan Gulch Reservoir Co. v. Swartz.9 Contrary to the dicta in
Garnet, the court held that an act of God or the common
enemy is a good defense under the statute. Although the suf-
ficiency of proof of act of God was not in issue, the court com-
mented that the uncontroverted evidence of the defendants
was sufficient to prove that the rainstorm could not have been
foreseen and therefore could be designated an act of God.'0
This comment by the court implies that if an occurrence is
foreseeable it is not an act of God.
This interpretation of Ryan is reinforced by Greeley Irri-
gation Co. v. Von Trotha1 ' where the court considered the issue
7 48 Colo. 285, 110 P. 79 (1910).
8 Id. at 289, 110 P. at 80. Justice Campbell, in a dissenting opinion, felt
that act of God must be an exception to the absolute liability imposed
by the statute. Id. at 297, 110 P. at 1136.
• 77 Colo. 60, 234 P. 1059 (1925).
10 Id. at 68, 234 P. at 1062.
1148 Colo. 12, 108 P. 985 (1910).
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of an act of God defense in a case not involving the overflow
statute. The court approved an instruction on the question of
what constitutes an extraordinary flood: that through the
"exercise of reasonable foresight and prudence the natural con-
sequences of such a flood could not be foreseen and guarded
against.
'12
In sum, the Colorado standard on act of God, as evidenced
by Ryan and Greeley Irrigation, is reasonable and prudent fore-
seeability. Any occurrence which is reasonably foreseeable
does not constitute an act of God. The evidence in both cases
further indicates that foreseeability will be tested by a direct
comparison with prior occurrences.
13
II. Barr v. Game, Fish and Parks Commission
Barr specifically reaffirms the holding in Ryan by acknowl-
edging that the act of God defense is available under the
statute of liability for overflow from a reservoir.1 4 But, prob-
ably because of the scarcity of Colorado precedent and the lack
of a direct ruling upon what specifically constitutes an act of
God, the court turned to Nebraska for its definition of the
defense.
A. Act of God- Standard
The Barr court states:
In Baum v. County of Scott's Bluff, 172 Neb. 225, 109 N.W.
2d 295 [1961], the court defined an act of God as follows: "In
order for a flood to come within the term act of God, it must
have been so unusual and extraordinary a manifestation of
nature as could not under normal conditions have been rea-
sonably anticipated or expected. . . An act of God does not
necessarily mean an operation of natural forces so violent and
unexpected that no human foresight or skill could possibly
have prevented its effect. It is enough that the flooding should
be such as human foresight could not be reasonably expected to
anticipate and whether it comes within this description is ordi-
narily a question of fact."' 5
This definition appears to differ from the Colorado rule de-
rived from Ryan and Greeley Irrigation since the standard of
reasonable foreseeability is not tied to prior occurrences. The
Baum court held that the test is whether a reasonable man,
12Id. at 22, 108 P. at 988.
13 In Greeley Irrigation the evidence was that the "extraordinary flood"
was one of the largest which had occurred in the vicinity. Id. at 12, 108
P. at 985. In Ryan the evidence was of an unusual and unprecedented
flood resulting from a clcudburst. Ryan Gulch Reservoir Co. v. Swartz,
77 Colo. 60, 234 P. 1059 (1925).
14 497 P.2d at 343.
15 Id. (emphasis added by the Colorado Court of Appeals).
1973
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
exercising reasonable human foresight, could have foreseen an
occurrence of the magnitude which actually occurred. The
facts in Baum, however, belie this conclusion. The evidentiary
question, which was held to be of sufficient weight to submit
the issue to the jury, was whether or not the storm which oc-
curred was greater than recorded prior occurrence.16
The test applied by Nebraska courts to the foreseeability
of any particular occurrence is clarified by an examination of
the precedent upon which Baum relied. The definition of act
of God was taken from Cover v. Platte Valley Public Power
& Irrigation District1 7 where the Nebraska court presumed that
if rainfall of a larger than ordinary amount has occurred in
the past, it will occur again. Cover, in turn, relied on Webb
v. Platte Valley Public Power & Irrigation District18 where it
was stated that "[t]he evidence is that it was not an un-
precedented rain; that many other similar rains had occurred
in the vicinity; and that defendant . . . could reasonably have
anticipated that such rains would happen again."'19
It is apparent from the foregoing that the Baum standard
of reasonable foreseeability is in application tested by com-
parison with prior occurrence. Thus, the court in Barr, by
adopting the definition of act of God from Nebraska, simply
clarified the existing law implied in the Colorado cases of
Ryan and Greeley Irrigation. In application, the rules of both
states on act of God are essentially the same: an occurrence
which can be reasonably foreseen, tested by comparison with
prior occurrence, is not an act of God. The importance of Barr,
however, rests with the changes it makes in the standard of
foreseeability and the unique test which the court applies.
B. Test - Maximum Probable Flood
The Barr court modifies the basic act of God rule by re-
defining the reasonable man and foreseeability. Relying on
Ryan and Baum, the court holds that a flood greater than
recorded prior occurrence, but reasonably foreseeable by an
engineer (as opposed to a reasonable man) is a foreseeable
flood, thereby precluding the act of God defense. Furthermore,
such an expert must "foresee" through the engineering tech-
nique of maximum probable flood prediction, a test based
upon prior occurrence. In the technique, that "prior occur-
16 172 Neb. 225, 235, 109 N.W.2d 295, 302 (1961).
17 162 Neb. 146, 75 N.W.2d 661 (1956).
18 146 Neb. 61, 18 N.W.2d 563 (1945).
19 Id. at 70, 18 N.W.2d at 568.
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rence" is one which occurred in a meteorologically similar
area, not necessarily the same basin, and through a process
of transposition and factoring for such variables as soil mois-
ture and antecedent conditions, the resultant predicted flood
is of greater magnitude than any previous occurrence in the
basin.
20
The court, therefore, has made two modifications in the
existing law; substituting an engineer for the reasonable man
and applying a test based upon prior occurrence rather than the
prior occurrence itself. What are the ramifications of these
changes by the Barr court?
III. THE EFFECT OF Barr ON SMALL DAM BUILDERS AND OWNERS
The definition of act of God adopted by Barr includes the
phrase " 'so unusual and extraordinary a manifestation of nature
as could not under normal conditions have been reasonably
anticipated or expected.' ",21 The definition of "normal condi-
tions" is a key element of what a reasonable person should
foresee. The court applies the maximum probable flood pre-
diction technique to this aspect of the problem. However,
according to hydrologists, the flood discharges predicted by
use of the technique "represent flood discharges that may be
expected from the most severe combination of critical meteoro-
logic and hydrologic conditions that are reasonably possible in
the region. ' --2 Certainly a layman cannot be expected to con-
20 The storm transposition method of maximum probable flood prediction
involves the transposing of a storm which actually occurred in a hydro-
meteorologically similar area over the basin in question. The storm is
then oriented over the basin to obtain maximum reasonable fit of the
storm to the basin. Factors such as ground elevation and dew point
are then applied to obtain release of maximum moisture content. The
precipitation which results is then factored by values for such variables
as infiltration characteristics and maximum reasonable antecedent soil
moisture in order to obtain the predicted runoff of the maximum
probable flood. See BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR,
DESIGN OF SMALL DAMS 19-61 (1960).
The predicted probable maximum flood is always greater than
recorded prior occurrence because the method is a maximizing process
of recorded prior occurrence. In the Texas gulf coast area, a hurricane
region, predicted probable maximum values approach equality with
recorded prior occurrence. In the experience of the engineering firm
whose experts are quoted by the Barr court, the probable maximum
flood has never been less than 1.05 times larger than recorded prior
occurrence and that was in the Texas gulf coast area. In the Colorado
plains region the average relationship is a probable maximum flood of
1.33 to 5 times larger than recorded prior occurrence. Interview with
William W. Wheeler, Jr., W.W. Wheeler & Associates, Inc., in Engle-
wood, Colorado, Oct. 11, 1972.
21 497 P.2d at 343 (emphasis added).
22 V. CHOW, HANDBOOK OF APPLIED HYDROLOGY § 25-26 (1964) (emphasis
added). As a matter of fact the storm transposition method approved
by the court in Barr is "the greatest maximizing process for a given
basin . . . ." Id. § 9-63.
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sider as "normal" the conditions involved in this technique.
Thus the court has created a much higher requirement of fore-
seeability by equating normal conditions with those severe
conditions presumed in the technique.
This redefinition places a heavy burden on the average
small dam owner. Possibly in response to this, the court has
complemented this higher level of foreseeability by holding
that "if the flow of water which occurred in the Clay Creek
basin was reasonably foreseeable by defendant's engineers, then
it may not be designated an act of God. ' 23 Presumably an
engineer would have the capability to use the technique and
understand what the court means by "normal conditions." But
does this substitution of an engineer for the reasonable man in
Barr mean that everyone planning a dam and reservoir of
whatever size needs an engineer's analysis? If not, to whom
does this holding apply?
According to expert opinion, the engineering design tech-
nique of maximum probable flood analysis is "confined to the
determination of spillway requirements for high dams [such
as that found in Barr], but in unusual cases [the maximum
probable flood] may constitute the design flood for local pro-
tection works where an exceptionally high degree of protec-
tion is advisable and economically obtainable." 24 In contrast,
Barr and the absolute liability statute involved, apply to all
reservoir dams in Colorado. 25 This expansion of the technique
to all reservoir dams is unfortunate not only because it contra-
dicts the engineering standards enunciated above, but also be-
cause it overlooks the fact that practicing engineers do not
always use the maximum probable flood technique in the design
of all reservoir dams. When engineers design small dams they
normally use criteria similar to those set forth by the Bureau
of Reclamation:
23497 P.2d at 343 (emphasis added).
24 V. CHow, supra note 22, § 25-26.
25 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-5-13 (1963) provides:
None of the provisions of sections 145-5-5 to 148-5-14 shall be
construed as relieving the owners of any such reservoir from
the payment of such damages as may be caused by the break-
ing of the embankments thereof, but in the event of any such
reservoir overflowing, or the embankments, dams or outlets
breaking or washing out, the owners thereof shall be liable for
all damage occasioned thereby.
The sections mentioned above refer to small dams which do not require
the State Engineer's approval for construction, and owners who do not
comply with the State Engineer's inspection and instructions for main-
tenance. Barr and the absolute liability statute probably do not apply
to the extremely small reservoir known as livestock water tanks which
are covered in COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-17-1 to -16 (1963).
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If Then
(1) Failure of structure (1) Inflow design flood is
would result in probable loss equivalent to the maximum
of human life. probable flood.
(2) Failure would cause (2) Irflow design flood may
great damage to property be as much less than maxi-
and project operation but mum probable as that ob-
loss of human life is not en- tained by assumption A.
visioned.
(3) Failure would cause (3) Inflow design flood may
only loss of structure with be as much less than maxi-
little damage to property mum probable as that ob-
and project operation. tained by assumption B.
26
Following these guidelines an engineer would use a design
flood of lesser magnitude in two of the three situations.
Thus, because a layman lacks the training and expertise to
use the maximum probable flood technique, a strict interpreta-
tion of Barr requires him to consult an engineer in the design
of a dam and reservoir of any size. The engineer is then
forced to abandon his normal design criteria and apply the
maximum probable flood technique regardless of the size of
the structure or the potential damage if the structure should
fail. Engineering services are expensive and the design and
construction costs of a small structure capable of handling a
flood of such large magnitude can be grossly disproportionate
to the benefits derived from the structure itself. The resultant
economic impact upon the layman owner-builder is such that
many small dams and reservoirs could not be built solely
because of the effect of Barr.
The court can avoid placing this economic burden on the
small reservoir owner-builder by limiting this decision to the
facts of the case, i.e., large structures. Because of the defini-
tion of act of God adopted from Baum, the standard in situa-
tions involving small structures could be a reasonable man
exercising reasonable human foresight to be tested by prior
occurrences. However, until the court so limits the holding of
Barr, it is incumbent upon the lawyer advising any reservoir
26 BUREAu OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR, DESIGN OF SMALL
DAMS 43 (1960). Assumption A involves the reduction by a statistical
factor of the precipitation predicted for probable maximum and then
application of that reduced precipitation to probable maximum ante-
cedent soil conditions. Under assumption B the reduced precipitation
of assumption A is applied to antecedent soil conditions of less than
probable maximum magnitude. Id.
The American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) Task Force on
Spillway Design Floods adopted similar criteria for when to use a design
flood of lesser magnitude than maximum probable. 90 ASCE JOURNAL
OF HYDRAULICS DIVISION 296-98 (1964). A Standard Project Design
Flood is usually 40 to 60% of maximum probable. V. CHOW, supra
note 22, § 25-26.
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owner or builder to emphasize the gamble involved in not
obtaining an engineer to design the structure to handle a
maximum probable flood.
IV. CONCLUSION
The defendant in Barr contended "that the trial court
abolished the defense of act of God by holding that damages
occasioned by this flood were not an act of God. '27 If the case
is strictly interpreted to hold that a maximum probable flood
is the test of the foreseeability of a design engineer as to
whether the defense is available, the defendant's contention
is well-founded. A maximum probable flood is of such magni-
tude that, except in areas such as "hurricane alleys," the
chances of an occurrence closely approaching' maximum prob-
able are remote. That being the case, the act of God defense is
seldom if ever available under such an interpretation of Barr.
The court could have avoided the problems and burdens
created by this decision. The central problem in such cases is
who should bear the cost of damage caused by the overflow
from a reservoir. Since the absolute liability statute is estab-
lished law, it is suggested that justice would be better served
if the statute were strictly applied without exceptions, result-
ing in a single issue of proximate cause. The court would then
have to answer only one question: would the damage which
occurred have occurred if the subject dam and reservoir were
not there? If the answer is yes, the defendant is not liable.
If the answer is no, the defendant is totally liable. If the
answer is that only a proportionate amount is attributable to
the existence of the dam, the defendant is liable for only that
proportionate amount.
The result in Barr is the same as it would be under the
above proximate cause analysis; but because of the ambigui-
ties and differing potential applications of the case, whether
the results under different fact situations would be as com-
mendable is not clear.
Kendall T. Sanford
27 497 P.2d at 342.
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